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Abstract
We develop a spatial two-country model of wage determination with private in-
formation in unionized imperfectly competitive industries. We investigate the e®ects
of separated product markets opening up for competition as well as of further mar-
ket integration on the negotiated wage and the strike activity. We show that, when
product markets are separated, the wage level and the strike activity are decreasing
with the transportation cost and the home market size. However, when markets are
integrated, wages and strikes are now increasing with the transportation cost. Finally,
we ¯nd that the opening of markets for competition has an ambiguous impact on both
the negotiated wage and the strike activity.
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473945.1 Introduction
The labour market implications of European integration are of considerable importance.
Since labour is not very mobile in Europe, the e®ects of international integration on labour
markets are mostly indirect via product market integration. More competitive product
markets would reduce the power in national labour markets, making them more competi-
tive. Andersen et al. (2000) have found that integration gradually changes labour market
structures and induces wage convergences as well as stronger wage interdependencies in
wage formation among European countries.
In the present paper we investigate the e®ects of separated product markets opening
up for competition as well as of further market integration on the negotiated wage and
the strike activity. In order to do it, we develop a spatial two-country model of wage
determination with private information in unionized imperfectly competitive industries.
In the literature, product market integration has been interpreted as a reduction in
costs associated with international trade: transport costs, tari®s, taxes, information costs
about foreign markets, etc. These costs could be divided into ¯xed costs or start up costs
associated with exporting, and variable costs proportional to the level of exports. Nay-
lor (1998) has shown that a decrease in variable export costs may give rise to a higher
wage since a monopoly union responds by increasing the wage rate to the increased em-
ployment's demand. However, Huizinga (1993) and Sorensen (1993) have shown that a
decrease in ¯xed costs, that implies the move from autarchy to fully integrated markets,
would increase the degree of competition in the product market and, as Dowrick (1989)
predicted, would reduce wages. More recently, Munch and Sorensen (2000) have shown
that a reduction in ¯xed costs leads to an unambiguous decrease in wages, whereas a
reduction in variable trade costs has an ambiguous e®ect on wages, due to the fact that
the introduction of international competition for some goods neutralizes the e®ect on the
employment's demand.
But, all these previous papers have used a complete information models which predict
e±cient outcomes of the bargaining process. In particular agreement is always settled
immediately, so that strikes cannot occur at equilibrium.1 This is not the case once
we introduce private information into the wage bargaining, in which the ¯rst rounds of
negotiation are used for information transmission between the two negotiators. So, the
main feature of our model is that both the union and the ¯rm have private information.
Moreover, our model enables us to study the impact of product markets opening up for
competition as well as of further market integration on wages and strikes.
1Strikes data seem to have a signi¯cant impact on the wage-employment relationship for collective
negotiations. See e.g. Kennan and Wilson (1989), Vannetelbosch (1996).
1We show that, when product markets are separated, the wage level and the strike activ-
ity are decreasing with the transportation cost and the country or market size. Moreover,
since the union of the country with the biggest size has a higher employment level than
the other country, this union will be willing to concede more rapidly during the wage
negotiation and it will be more easy for the ¯rm to screen the union's type. As a result,
the strike activity tends to be smaller in the country with the biggest size.
However, when markets are integrated, wages and strikes are now increasing with
the transportation cost. Indeed, when ¯rms produce in related product markets, wage
settlements create spillover e®ects by altering the ¯rms' relative competitive positions in
the product market.2 The wage spillover e®ects create incentives to lower wages in order to
gain a larger share of the product market and to induce more concessions and less strikes
or lock-outs during the wage negotiations. Moreover, these incentives are stronger the
smaller the transportation cost and the country size are. Therefore, once product markets
are integrated, a marginal increase in product market integration modelled as a decrease
in transportation costs will reduce the wage and the strike activity in both countries.
We also compare the strike activity when product markets are integrated with the
strike activity when product markets are separated. We ¯nd that, the more amount of
private information the ¯rm and the union have and the smaller the transportation cost
is, the more likely the strike activity will decrease when markets open up for competition.
However, it is not excluded that theoretically, the strike activity might increase in one
country and decrease in the other country when markets open up for competition. For
example, if it is commonly known that the union is stronger than the ¯rm and the pri-
vate information is small enough, then the strike activity of the country with the smallest
(greatest) market size will decrease (increase) when separated product markets open up
for competition. Indeed, when separated product markets open up for competition, the
biggest (the smallest) country will loose (gain) a substantial market share. As a conse-
quence, the union of the biggest (the smallest) country will behave more aggressively (less
aggressively) in wage negotiations in order to get a higher wage that compensates the
anticipated lost in employment. Therefore, more (less) strike activity would result in the
biggest (smallest) country.
Finally, we ¯nd, even for the complete information case, results that are contrary to
previous results obtained in the literature. Indeed, we show that the opening of product
markets for competition has an ambiguous impact on the negotiated wage level. If the
countries sizes or initial markets sizes are di®erent enough, then the opening of markets
2Davidson (1988) and Horn and Wolinsky (1988) were ¯rst to study the impact of wage spillover e®ects
on the interaction of union-¯rm bargaining and duopolistic quantity-setting. Dowrick (1989) has studied
how product market power and pro¯tability are related to wages.
2could increase (reduce) the wage outcome in the country with the biggest (the smallest)
size.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model is presented. The price
game in the monopolistic and duopolistic markets are solved assuming that the wages
have already been determined. Section 3 describes the wage bargaining game and solves
this game for the case of two separated product markets. Section 4 is devoted to the
wage bargaining game for the case of an integrated product market. Finally, Section 5
concludes.
2 The Model
We assume that there are two countries A and B and that in each country there is one
¯rm producing a homogeneous good. The two ¯rms are located on a Hotelling line with
unit length. Firm A is located at the left extreme while ¯rm B is located at the right end
point of the unit interval. Consumers have non-negative linear transportation costs t per
unit of distance. They are uniformly distributed along the interval and have density one.
Consumers buy exactly one unit of the good. A consumer located at a distance x from
¯rm A gets the following utility from buying the good to ¯rm A :
v(t;x) = 1¡ t¢ x.
Let xi denote the quantity produced by ¯rm i, and let ¦i denote the pro¯t levels of each
¯rm i (i = A;B). Production technology exhibits constant returns to scale with labour
as the sole input and is normalized in such a way that xi = li, where li is labor input.
The total cost to ¯rm i of producing quantity xi is xi ¢ wi, where wi is the wage in ¯rm
i. In addition, each ¯rm is unionized, and enters into an agreement with its risk-neutral
union. The workforce for each ¯rm is drawn from separate pools of labour, and the union
objective is to maximize the economic rent, i.e.
Ui(wi;w;li;(xA;xB)) = li ¢ (wi ¡ w),
where w is the reservation wage. The pro¯t of each ¯rm is given by
¦i(wi;li;(xA;xB)) = pi ¢ xi ¡ wi ¢ xi:
Initially, the two countries constitute two separated markets with k < 1 and (1 ¡ k)
being the market sizes of country A and country B, respectively. Interactions between the
integration of product markets, the wage bargaining and the strike activity are analyzed
according to the following game structure. In stage one, wages are determined by nego-
tiations between the ¯rm and the union in each country. In stage two, each ¯rm chooses
price, employment and output. The model is solved backwards.
3In the last stage of the game, the wage levels have already been determined. When
product market is not integrated each ¯rm serves the consumers located in his own country




















2t < 1 ¡ k



















2t < 1 ¡k
1 ¡(1 ¡k) ¢ t otherwise
.
Throughout the paper we will focus on the more interesting case, namely the case
where a monopolist would like to cover the entire integrated market. This assumption
reverts to consider only the equilibrium where x¤
A = k, x¤
B = (1 ¡ k), p¤
A = 1 ¡ k ¢ t
and p¤
B = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ k) ¢ t. So, when markets are separated, both ¯rms are constrained
by their respective market size and are covering their entire home market. Hence, the
equilibrium output of each ¯rm coincides with its market size and does not depend on the
transportation cost. An increase in the transportation cost reduces the utility of consumers
from buying the good and the monopolistic price that the ¯rm can charge.
When product markets are integrated, both ¯rms compete by choosing simultaneously













with i;j = A;B, i 6= j. The Nash equilibrium output of each ¯rm (and hence, equilibrium
level of employment) is decreasing with the transportation cost and with its own wage,
while it is increasing with the other ¯rm's wage. In case of wi = wj, the equilibrium
output will be constant and equal to 1
2. Finally, notice that, contrary to the case of
separated product markets, an increase in the transportation cost reduces now the degree
of competition between ¯rms and increases the prices that both ¯rms can charge.
In the ¯rst stage of the game, ¯rms and unions negotiate the wages foreseeing perfectly
the e®ect of wages on the decisions concerning output and employment. To investigate
the consequences of product market integration on the negotiated wage and the strike
activity, we analyze ¯rst the wage negotiations when both markets are separated.
3 Two Separated Markets
In each country, the wage negotiation proceeds as in Rubinstein's (1982) alternating-o®er
bargaining model. The ¯rm and the union make alternatively wage o®ers, with the ¯rm
4making o®ers in odd-numbered periods and the union making o®ers in even-numbered
periods. The negotiation ends when one of the negotiators accepts an o®er. No limit is
placed on the time that may be expended in bargaining and perpetual disagreement is a
possible outcome. The union is on strike in every period until an agreement is reached.
Both negotiators are assumed to be impatient. Indeed, the ¯rm and the union have time
preferences with constant discount rates rf > 0 and ru > 0, respectively. We assume that
the unions of both countries have the same discount rate ru and the ¯rms of both countries
have also the same discount rate rf.
As the interval between o®ers and countero®ers is short and shrinks to zero, the
alternating-o®er model has a unique limiting subgame perfect equilibrium, which approx-
imates the Nash bargaining solution to the bargaining problem (see Binmore et al., 1986).
Thus the predicted wage is given by
wSPE
s,i = argmax[Ui ¡U0]
® ¢[¦i ¡ ¦0]
1¡®,
where the lowerscript "s" means that product (and labour) markets are separated and
wage bargaining is made independently in each country, where U0 = 0 and ¦0 = 0 are the
status-quo payo®s, and where i = A;B. The parameter ® 2 (0;1) is the union bargaining
power which is equal to rf
ru+rf, and it is the same for both unions. Simple computation
gives us
wSPE
s,A = w +
®
2



















¡ 2t(1 ¡k)] (2)
Expressions (1) and (2) tell us that, when a monopolist would cover the entire market
if both markets were integrated, then the equilibrium wage in each country is increasing
with the reservation wage w and with the union bargaining power ®, but is decreasing
with the transportation cost t and with its market size. Notice also that, if both countries
or markets are of the same size, i.e. k = 1
2, then the equilibrium wages coincide.











[(1 ¡w)(2 ¡ ®(3¡ ®)) ¡2tk(1 ¡2®)],










[(1 ¡ w)(2 ¡®(3 ¡®)) ¡2t(1 ¡k)(1 ¡2®)],
for country B. In both countries the union and the ¯rm equilibrium payo®s are decreasing
with t and with w. Meanwhile each ¯rm equilibrium payo® is decreasing with the union
bargaining power and increasing with its market size, each union equilibrium payo® is
increasing with its bargaining power but could be increasing or decreasing with the market
size. Precisely, the union equilibrium payo® is increasing with the market size of its ¯rm
if and only if the market size is smaller than (3 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ w)[8t]¡1. Finally, since we are
considering the case where a monopolist would cover the entire market if both markets
were integrated, the equilibrium employment of each ¯rm coincides with its home market
size.
Strikes data seem to have a signi¯cant impact on the wage-employment relationship for
collective negotiations. See e.g. Kennan and Wilson (1989), Vannetelbosch (1996). How-
ever, both the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and the Rubinstein's model predict
e±cient outcomes of the bargaining process. In particular agreement is settled immedi-
ately, so that strikes cannot occur at equilibrium. This is not the case once we introduce
private information into the wage bargaining, in which the ¯rst rounds of negotiation are
used for information transmission between the two negotiators.
The main feature of the negotiation is that both negotiators have private information.
Each negotiator does not know the impatience (or discount rate) of the other party. It










u. The superscripts "I" and "P" identify the most impatient and most patient
types, respectively. The types are independently drawn from the set [rP
j ;rI
j] according to
the probability distribution pj, for j =u,f. We allow for general distributions over discount
rates. This uncertainty implies bounds on the union bargaining power which are denoted















Lemma 1 (Separated markets) Consider the wage bargaining with private informa-
tion in which the distributions pf and pu are common knowledge, and in which the period














This lemma follows from Watson's (1998) analysis of Rubinstein's alternating-o®er bar-
gaining model with two-sided incomplete information.3 As Watson (1998) stated, Lemma
3Watson (1998) characterized the set of PBE payo®s which may arise in Rubinstein's alternating-o®er
bargaining game and constructed bounds (which are met) on the agreements that may be made. The
bounds and the PBE payo®s set are determined by the range of incomplete information and are easy to
61 establishes that "each player will be no worse than he would be in equilibrium if it were
common knowledge that he were his least patient type and the opponent were his most
patient type. Furthermore, each player will be no better than he would be in equilibrium
with the roles reversed".4 From Lemma 1 we have that the PBE wage outcome in country
A, w¤


































Notice that each wage satisfying these bounds can be the outcome by choosing appropri-
ately the distribution over types. The lower (upper) bound is the wage outcome of the
complete information game, when it is common knowledge that the union's type is rI
u
(rP
u) and the ¯rm's type is rP
f (rI
f) (and the union bargaining power is ® (®)). Expression
(3) implies bounds on the ¯rm's employment level, as well as on the ¯rm's output, at
equilibrium. In case of country B, the PBE wage outcome, w¤


































¡ 2t(1 ¡ k)]:
Lemma 1 and Expressions (3) and (4) also tell us that ine±cient outcomes are possible,
even as the period length shrinks to zero. The wage bargaining game may involve delay
(strikes or lock-outs), but not perpetual disagreement, at equilibrium. Indeed, Watson
(1998) has constructed a bound on delay in equilibrium which shows that an agreement is
reached in ¯nite time and that delay time equals zero as incomplete information vanishes.
In the literature on strikes, three di®erent measures of strike activity are usually pro-
posed: the strike incidence, the strike duration, and the number of work days lost due to
work stoppages. See e.g. Cheung and Davidson (1991), Kennan and Wilson (1989). Since
compute because they correspond to the SPE payo®s of two bargaining games of complete information.
These two games are de¯ned by matching one player's most impatient type with the opponent's most
patient type.
4Lemma 1 is not a direct corollary to Watson (1998) Theorem 1 because Watson's work focuses on
linear preferences, but the analysis can be modi¯ed to handle the present case. Translating Watson
(1998) Theorem 2 to our framework completes the characterization of the PBE payo®s. For any e U 2
[U¤
s,¢(®);U¤
s,¢(®)], e ¦ 2 [¦¤
s,¢(®);¦¤
s,¢(®)], there exists distributions pu and pf, and a PBE such that the PBE
payo®s are e U and e ¦. In other words, whether or not all payo®s within the intervals given in Lemma 1 are
possible depends on the distributions over types. See also Vannetelbosch (1997).
7we allow for general distributions over types and we may encounter a multiplicity of PBE,
we are unable to compute measures of strike activity as the ones just mentioned. Indeed,
in order to compute an expected strike duration one would need to ¯x some parameters
of the model such as the distribution over types but it would imply a substantial loss of
generality. So, we propose to identify the strike activity (strikes or lock-outs) with the
maximal delay in reaching a wage agreement. Following Watson (1998) Theorem 3, the
larger is the di®erence between the upper bound and lower bound on the bargaining out-
come, the larger is the potential delay for obtaining an agreement. Therefore, the strike
activity is given by the di®erence between the upper bound and the lower bound on the
wage outcome. Our measure of strike activity gives the scope each player has for screening
his opponent by making wage proposals satisfying the expressions (3) or (4), and hence,
for delaying the wage agreement. Only in average this measure is a good proxy of actual
strike activity.







































The strike activity in country B, ªs,B, is also given by expression (5) with k replaced by
1 ¡ k. Notice that, if k = 1
2, the strike activity is the same in both countries. Therefore,
both ªs,A and ªs,B are increasing (decreasing) functions of rI
u (rP
u), are decreasing (in-
creasing) functions of rP
f (rI
f), and are decreasing with the reservation wage w, with the
transportation cost t, and with their own market or country size.5
Proposition 1 In the case of two separated product markets, the strike activity is de-
creasing with the country or market size and is greater in the country or market of smaller
size.
The explanation behind this result is the following one. Comparing ¯rst the PBE wage
outcomes, we observe that
w¤
s,A(®;®) > w¤
s,B(®;®) if t >
(1¡ w)(® ¡®)(3 ¡(® + ®))
4(®(1 ¡k) ¡ ®k)
.
If k > 1
2, it is more likely for values of ® and ® that the above condition will be satis¯ed.
So, country A will tend to enjoy a greater employment level and wage level than country
5However, the strike activity does not depend on the country or market size when the size is not a
binding restriction. See the Appendix.
8B. Therefore, it will be more easy for the ¯rm to screen the union's type, and so the union
of country A will concede more rapidly during the wage negotiation. As a result, strike
activity in country A will be smaller.
4 An Integrated Product Market
Now, we consider the situation in which product markets open up for competition and
both ¯rms compete in prices in the integrated product market. As before, we assume
that, in each country, the ¯rm and the union negotiate wages as in Rubinstein's (1982)
alternating-o®er bargaining model. The two negotiations take place simultaneously and
separately. That is, when negotiating the country wage level, the union and the ¯rm of
each country take the wage settlement of the other country as given. Moreover, in both
countries the union and the ¯rm always correctly anticipate the e®ect of wages on the
subsequent price competition.












where ® is still the union's bargaining power and it is given by expression
rf
ru+rf, and where
the lowerscript "c" means that product markets are integrated in a common market and
wage bargaining is made separately (but not independently) in each country (since the
outcome of the bargaining in one country may depend on the outcome of the bargaining
in the other country, and vice versa). Simple computations give us
wSPE










Expression (6) tells us that, in complete information, the wage outcome when markets are
integrated is still increasing with the reservation wage w and with the union bargaining
power ®. But now, contrary to the case with separated product markets, the wage outcome
is increasing with the transportation cost t. One explanation follows. A marginal increase
in product market integration, modelled as a decrease in transportion (or trade) costs,
increases the degree of competition (decreases prices) without changing labour demands.
As a result, the pro¯ts of the ¯rm and the negotiated wage decrease.6
6Our result contrasts with Naylor (1998) who has shown that a decrease in t results in a higher labour
demand. Then, the monopolistic unions exploit the higher labour demand to obtain higher wages.
9Knowing the wage levels, one can easily obtain the equilibrium employment levels as















Thus, contrary to the case of separated markets, the union and the ¯rm equilibrium payo®s
are increasing with the transportation cost t. Not very surprisingly, the union equilibrium
payo® is also increasing with the union bargaining power. Finally, the equilibrium em-
ployment level in both ¯rms is the same and equal to 1
2 = x¤
A = x¤
B. This is due to the
fact that, once product markets open up for competition, both ¯rms are symmetric ones.
For the complete information situation, we compare now the equilibrium outcomes
obtained under integrated product markets with the ones obtained for the case of two
separated markets. We get that
wSPE
c,A > wSPE
s,A if and only if t >





s,B if and only if t >
(2 ¡®)(1 ¡w)(3 ¡®)
2(3 +(1 ¡k)(4¡ 2®))
.
So, the factors which increase the likelihood that product market integration will increase
the equilibrium wage of a country are : a big home market, strong unions, and high
reservation wages.
Proposition 2 The greater the initial market size of a country, the union bargaining
power, and the reservation wage are, the more likely the country's wage will increase when
markets open up for competition.
Remember that we are considering the case where a monopolist would like to cover
the entire integrated market. That is, we have assumed that the transportation cost is
not too large :
t ·
(2 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ w)
4
.




(2 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ w)(3 ¡®)
2(3 + k(4 ¡ 2®))








(2¡ ®)(1¡ w)(3 ¡®)
2(3+ (1¡ k)(4 ¡ 2®))




10Thus, in order to guarantee that it could exist a transportation cost t such that, for any
® 2 (0;1),
(2¡ ®)(1 ¡ w)
4
> t >
(2 ¡®)(1 ¡w)(3 ¡ ®)
2(3 +k(4 ¡2®))
and/or
(2¡ ®)(1 ¡ w)
4
> t >
(2 ¡®)(1 ¡w)(3 ¡ ®)
2(3 +(1 ¡k)(4¡ 2®))
,
it is necessary that k is greater than 3
4 or is smaller than 1
4. For example, if k > 3=4,
market integration could increase the equilibrium wage outcome in country A but then it
would decrease the equilibrium wage outcome in country B.7 That is, if the market sizes
of both countries are di®erent enough, then market integration increases (reduces) the
wage outcome in the country with the greatest (the smallest) market size while reducing
(increasing) output and employment in that country.
In fact, when both ¯rms compete in the integrated product market, wage spillover
e®ects are present. These spillover e®ects tends to lower wages but are decreasing with
the transportation cost and with the country market size. As a consequence, in stage one
of the game, the ¯rm (and the union) of the country with the smallest market size has a
greater incentive to commit to a low wage in order to obtain a larger market share in stage
two, than the ¯rm (and the union) of the country with the greatest market size. On the
contrary, the union of the country with the greatest market size may be tempted to obtain
an increase of the negotiated wage that would compensate the anticipated reduction in
employment and output level due to the integration of both product markets.
We consider now the country-level wage bargaining with private information about
the discount rates. Once product markets are integrated, both ¯rms are symmetric ones.
Hence, we look for symmetric PBE.
Lemma 2 (Integrated markets) Consider the country-level wage negotiations with in-
complete information in which the distributions pf and pu are common knowledge, and
in which the period length shrinks to zero. Assume that inside each country the union
and the ¯rm take the wage settlement in the other country as given during the bargaining.
Then, for any symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE), the payo® of the union in
each country belongs to [U¤
c(®);U¤




7Notice that if k = 1=2 then the above conditions are never satis¯ed whatever the union bargaining
power. Therefore, if the initial market sizes of both countries are identical, then market integration
decreases the equilibrium wages, leaving unchanged the output and employment levels of both countries.
This result is similar to the one obtained by Dowrick (1989), Huizinga (1993) and Sorensen (1993) who
showed that product market integration may give rise to lower wages due to an increase in the degree of
competition.
11Lemma 2 is the counterpart of Lemma 1 for the country-level wage negotiations when
product markets are integrated. Following Lemma 2 and the complete information re-
sults we are able to state some properties about the country-level wage outcomes. The
symmetric PBE wage outcome w¤















Notice that each wage satisfying these bounds can be the outcome by choosing appropri-
ately the distribution over types. The lower (upper) bound is the wage outcome of the
complete information game, when it is common knowledge that the union's type is rI
u (rP
u)
and the ¯rm's type is rP
f (rI
f) (and the union bargaining power is ® (®)).
A su±cient condition such that, with private information about the discount rates,
market integration will increase the wage in country A is
w¤
c(®;®) > w¤
s,A(®;®) if t >
®(2 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ w)(3 ¡®)
2(3® + k®(4 ¡2®))
.
Similarly, a su±cient condition such that, with private information about the discount
rates, market integration will increase the wage in country B is
w¤
c(®;®) > w¤
s,B(®;®) if t >
®(2 ¡®)(1¡ w)(3 ¡®)
2(3® +(1 ¡k)®(4 ¡2®))
.
Notice that, if ® = ® = ® then these two conditions coincide with the ones under complete
information. Thus, if k is greater than 3
4 or smaller than 1
4 and the amount of private
information j® ¡®j is small enough, it is very likely that we recover the results obtained
under complete information. Hence, if the transportation cost t satis¯es the inequalities
(8), then market integration will increase for sure the wage level in country A. Similarly, if
the transportation cost t satis¯es the inequalities (9), then market integration will increase










®(2 ¡®)(1 ¡w)(3 ¡®)
2(3® + (1 ¡k)®(4 ¡2®))
. (9)

















Similarly to the case of separated product markets, we observe that ªc is increasing
(decreasing) with rI
u (rP
u), and decreasing (increasing) with rP
f (rI
f). But now, the strike
12activity is increasing with the transportation cost t. The intuition behind this result has
to do with the competition on the product market. As mentioned before, when product
markets are integrated, each union-¯rm pair expects to be able to alter its relative wage
position in the integrated industry. Therefore, it results wage spillover e®ects: each union-
¯rm pair has an incentive to lower wages in order to increase its output level and the ¯rm
pro¯ts, and to gain a larger share of the integrated product market. This incentive is
stronger the smaller the transportation costs are. Indeed, a marginal increase in product
market integration modelledas a decrease in transportation costs increases the competition
between ¯rms. This explain why it is likely that more concessions and less con°icts in wage
negotiations will occur when transportation cost decrease.
Proposition 3 In the case of integrated product markets, a marginal increase in product
market integration modelled as a decrease in the transportation cost will reduce the strike
activity in both countries.
Now we compare the strike activity when product markets are integrated with the
strike activity when product markets are separated. That is, we compare Expression (5)
with Expression (10). For country A, this comparison leads to the following result :
ªc < ªs,A if and only if t <
(1 ¡ w)(3 ¡(® + ®))(2 ¡®)(2 ¡®)
4(3+ k(2 ¡®)(2¡ ®))
.
For country B, this comparison leads to :
ªc < ªs,B if and only if t <
(1 ¡w)(3 ¡ (® +®))(2 ¡ ®)(2 ¡®)
4(3 + (1 ¡k)(2 ¡®)(2 ¡®))
).
Notice that the conditions on t coincide whenever both countries have the same market
size. From these conditions we are able to draw the following result.
Proposition 4 The more amount of private information the ¯rm and the union have and
the smaller the transportation cost is, the more likely the strike activity will decrease when
markets open up for competition.
This result might corroborate some empirical observations about the European market
integration. In 1985 both Spain and Portugal (as well as Greece) joined the European
Community. One of their main competitor is France. We observe that, before the market
opened up the average number of strikes and lock-outs was 2885 for France, 1861 for
Spain, and 437 for Portugal. But, after the market opened up, the average number of
strikes and lock-outs drops quite signi¯catively to 1663 for France, 1153 for Spain, and
280 for Portugal (Sources : ILO Yearbook. Data on strikes and lock-outs from 1976 until
1999). Moreover, the number of strikes has still decreased during the last decade due to
13gradually more integration which is modelled by a decrease of the transportation cost t in
our model (see Proposition 3).
However, it is not excluded that, the strike activity might increase in one country and
decrease in the other country when markets open up for competition. One can check that,
if w¤
c(®;®) > w¤
s,A(®;®) then ªc > ªs,A, and if w¤
c(®;®) > w¤
s,B(®;®) then ªc > ªs,B.
Take the case where country A has a home market size greater than 3
4. Assume that the





s,B(®;®). Then, from Proposition 1 and the results here above, we have
ªs,A < ªc and ªs,A < ªs,B. So, we do not know whether ªc is smaller or greater than
ªs,B. But, if it is commonly known that the union is stronger than the ¯rm (i.e. ® ¸ 0:5)
and the amount of private information j® ¡®j is small enough, then the strike activity
of the country with the smallest market size will decrease when markets open up for
competition. The intuition behind this result follows. When separated product markets
open up for competition, the biggest (the smallest) country will loose (gain) a substantial
market share. As a consequence, the union of the biggest (the smallest) country will behave
more aggressively (less aggressively) in wage negotiations in order to get a higher wage
that compensates the anticipated lost in employment. Therefore, more (less) strike activity
would result in the biggest (smallest) country.
Proposition 5 If it is commonly known that the union is stronger than the ¯rm and
the private information is small enough, then the strike activity of the country with the
smallest (greatest) market size will decrease (increase) when separated product markets
open up for competition.
5 Conclusion
Within an incomplete information framework, we have developed a spatial two-country
model with imperfectly competitive product markets and unionized labor markets. Two
¯rms located on former segmented product markets start to compete at the same enlarged
product market. We have investigated the e®ects of product market integration on the
negotiated wage and the strike activity. When product markets are segmented, both the
wage outcome and the strike activity in each country decrease with the transportation cost
and the market size. However, when product markets are integrated, wages and strikes
increase with the transportation cost which is interpreted as the degree of integration.
Contrary to the results found in the literature, we have shown that, under the complete
information framework, a reduction in ¯xed costs (that makes product markets opening
up for competition) has an ambiguous impact on the negotiated wage. So, our model
14suggests that, even with complete information, one should be cautious when making policy
recommendations with respect to the impact of product market integration on wages and
employment levels.
Nevertheless, this ambiguity did not prevent us to draw very interesting results once
private information is introduced. Indeed, we have shown that, the greater the initial
market size of a country, the stronger the union and the higher the reservation wage are,
the more likely the country's wage will increase when markets open up for competition.
With respect to the strike activity we get : the more amount of private information the
¯rm and the union have and the smaller the transportation cost is, the more likely the
strike activity will decrease when markets open up for competition.
The related literature has modelled the wage negotiation using the monopoly union
model, where in fact the union chooses the wage which maximize its utility. See Naylor
(1998), Munch and Sorensen (2000). Here, we have used the more general right-to-manage
model, where the union and the ¯rm really negotiate the wage and we have shown that
the results obtained with a monopoly union are not robust to this generalization.
We have also assumed that ¯rms are exogenously located at the extreme points of
the unit interval. One could analyze the issue of location by using the Hotelling interval
with quadratic transportation costs. See d'Aspremont et al. (1979). Each ¯rm then has
the possibility to reduce the degree of horizontal di®erentiation by moving towards the
center of its incumbent market. This would maximize the pro¯ts when product markets
are segmented as the monopolist could extract more surplus from its consumers. The
decrease in horizontal di®erentiation however increases price competition once product
markets are integrated. The revenues from selling to new consumers therefore decrease.
This re°ects the principle of maximal di®erentiation. Therefore, the assumption we made
of positioning ¯rms at the two opposite extremes o®ers the highest scope for pro¯table
entry in the other product market.
There are a number of potential directions for further work. First, the paper has
focussed on the case of former monopolistic product markets with identical technologies
and transportation costs. It would be interesting to consider various initial di®erences
across the product markets, such as in market structure, technologies and transportation
costs. Second, we have restricted our analysis to the case of ¯xed ¯rms' locations. Since the
market can be supplied by ¯rms from anywhere within the integrated market, it becomes
less important where ¯rms locate. Firms could move to areas with low production costs,
leaving high cost areas. Dri±ll and Ploeg (1995) showed that wages decrease if unions take
this into account. A complete analysis of this situation, as well as empirical studies, is left
for further research.
156 Appendix
Solving the case of separated markets when the countries market sizes are not binding
restrictions, we obtain under complete information the following results :
wSPE
s,A = w +
®
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s,B = w +
®
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¤ (1 ¡w) = ªs,B.
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